We argue that the previously documented association between ex ante information (e.g., earnings forecasts) and the subsequent, apparently predictable security price performance is potentially exaggerated. The exaggeration stems from non-random deletion of data, especially in highly right-skewed distributions of long-horizon security returns. Our simulations demonstrate that both forecast optimism and negative abnormal returns are induced when "extreme" observations of ex post long-horizon performance are truncated from samples of rationally priced, unbiased earnings forecasts. Our results suggest caution in interpreting the results of the accounting and finance research that examines the predictability of long-horizon performance based on ex ante information.
Introduction
There is mounting evidence of long-horizon security price under-performance following corporate events like an initial public offering (IPO) and seasoned equity offerings (Loughran and Ritter, 1995 , Ritter, 1991 , and Spiess and Affleck-Graves, 1995 . Systematic, predictable post-event under-performance violates semi-strong form of market efficiency. Several studies suggest caution in interpreting the evidence of long-horizon price performance for methodological reasons (see, for example, Barber and Lyon, 1997 , Brav, 1999 , Kothari and Warner, 1997 , and Fama, 1998 and others question the economic significance of the evidence (e.g., Brav, Geczy, and Gompers, 1998 , Brav and Gompers, 1997 , and Fama, 1998 .
There is an emerging literature that seeks to strengthen the inference of systematic longhorizon return predictability. This literature documents a positive cross-sectional association between ex post long-horizon under-performance and management's ex ante optimistic financial reporting or analysts' optimistic forecasts at the time of events like an IPO. Examples of studies in the context of performance following initial or seasoned equity offerings include Teoh, Welch, and Wong (1998a and b) , Rajan and Servaes (1997) , Dechow, Hutton, and Sloan (1998), and Ali (1996) . In the context of security-price performance following analysts' forecasts examples of research are La Porta (1996) , Dechow and Sloan (1997) , and Frankel and Lee (1998) . 1 The underlying logic behind the inference of systematic mispricing due to the market's naïve reliance on analysts' optimistically biased forecasts is as follows.
There is voluminous evidence that analysts' forecasts are overly optimistic (see, for example, Brown, Foster, and Noreen, 1985 , Brown, 1997 , Lim, 1998 , Abarbanell, 1991 1 Also see Lakonishok, Shliefer, and Vishny, 1994, and Sloan, 1996. 3 proxy for over-optimism. Observations frequently are excluded simply because many firms do not survive the ex post long horizon or data are unavailable. Firms are delisted because of mergers, acquisitions, takeovers, bankruptcies, etc. For example, the sample of 1,649 IPOs in Teoh et al. (1998b) declines steadily to 739 (or less than 45% of the initial sample size) by year 6 because either firms do not survive or data are unavailable. Studies using analysts' long-term forecasts from the Institutional Brokers Estimate System (IBES) lose 50% or more observations because of lack of availability of long-term growth forecasts and/or financial data on Compustat or Center for Research in Security Prices (CRSP) tapes. For example, Dechow and Sloan (1997) , Frankel and Lee (1998) , and Dechow, Hutton, and Sloan (1999) all suffer severe data attrition, although the researchers might not be in a position to avoid it. The lack of data availability is more common among smaller market capitalization stocks. Some of these stocks might be young, small, volatile firms, and others might be those who have experienced extreme poor performance.
Deliberate deletion of observations arises because some observations are considered "outliers" in the sample. This active truncation of the data is more likely when analyzing IPO samples or samples of small firms. These firms' ex post performance distribution is highly right skewed due to a few extreme performers. For example, among the recent IPO firms, America
Online has earned over 11,000% return and Dell Computer Corporation has earned over 5,500%
return in five years ending in October 1999. If included in a sample, these observations will likely be considered outliers based on non-arbitrary and well-known statistical techniques (e.g.
Cook's-D influence statistic). Therefore, truncation of such observations might be considered innocuous. However, in setting prices at any point in time, an efficient market rationally incorporates the possibility of firms earning extreme returns in future. If ex post extreme performers are truncated purely for statistical reasons, then observations containing information are non-randomly deleted from the sample. This kind of active truncation, coupled with the 4 passive truncation of non-surviving firms, can contribute to the apparent evidence of mispricing documented in the literature.
The degree of systematic mispricing documented in past research is greater among the small market capitalization and relatively newly listed stocks. The evidence is often attributed to a lack of analyst and investor following, which creates a greater potential for the market being misled by analysts' optimistic forecasting or management's optimistic financial reporting.
Our study suggests an alternative interpretation: the mispricing evidence might be an artifact of data problems and statistical techniques of data analysis. There appears to be a need to discriminate between the two competing explanations.
In summary, if the sample firms' survival and/or data deletion are not random with respect to the ex post performance variables, we show that statistical inferences are biased. We use simulation evidence to show that even a small degree of non-random data truncation (e.g., deletion of extreme ½% largest and smallest observations) can induce a statistically significant association between ex post performance and ex ante forecast variables of the magnitude reported in previous research to conclude market inefficiency.
Summary of simulation results.
The simulations examine the effect of data truncation (either due to survival, or to remove influential observations or outliers) in the presence of skewed distributions of economic variables for tests of rational pricing of securities.
Specifically, we simulate rational analyst forecasts in the sense that they are unbiased estimates of future earnings. In the simulations, earnings realizations equal forecasted earnings plus a forecast error that is uncorrelated with the forecast. This means earnings realizations are more variable than the forecasts, which is a property of rational forecasts. Greater variability of earnings compared to their forecasts is also observed empirically. The pricing is also rational in the simulations. The price change from the time of forecast to the time of earnings realization is a noisy function of the forecast error. The forecast error and price change distributions are right 5 skewed with the parameters of the distributions being less extreme compared to those reported in the literature for IPOs and seasoned equity offerings.
3
Consistent with rational analyst forecasts and rational pricing, when none of the observations is deleted, the simulated data do not exhibit systematic mispricing. In particular, ex post forecast errors are uncorrelated with the ex ante earnings forecasts. In addition, forecast errors are statistically indistinguishable from zero. Similarly, security-price performance or abnormal returns have a zero mean and they are uncorrelated with the ex ante analyst forecasts.
We then examine the consequence of deleting up to 2% extreme earnings observations (i.e., largest and smallest 1% observations). The results are dramatically different from those obtained without data deletion. They are now overwhelmingly consistent with systematic mispricing. Since we simulate right-skewed distributions, data truncation imparts a negative bias to the analyst forecast errors, suggesting analyst over-optimism. More interestingly, there is a statistically reliable negative relation between ex post returns and ex ante analyst forecasts. The statistical association is documented using regressions of ex post returns on ex ante forecasts as well as Mishkin's (1983) non-linear tests of rational pricing, which appear to have assumed the status of an industry standard to test market efficiency. These tests provide evidence consistent with systematic mispricing or return predictability arising from analyst optimism and market's naïve reliance on analysts' optimistic forecasts. In summary, the simulations demonstrate that even if analysts' forecasts and pricing are rational, the deletion of a small number of extreme observations can create an appearance of highly significant systematic mispricing resulting from the market's naïve reliance on analysts' optimistic forecasts. Ironically, one motivation for truncating extreme data is to remove observations that represent possibly anomalous (but 6 unexplained) valuations. Our analysis, however, shows that truncation can in fact create the appearance of irrational pricing in the rest of the sample.
Caveats. While we demonstrate the potential for the degree of mispricing being magnified as a result of the market's naïve reliance on analysts' optimistic forecasts and/or management's optimistic financial reporting, we emphasize that our work is silent on longhorizon post-IPO or post-seasoned-equity offerings security price performance. In these contexts previous research is careful in avoiding survival bias and data truncation in estimating the security-price performance. Our work also does not directly touch upon examining biases in analysts' forecasts. Our study has a limited objective of examining whether survival biases and data truncation can magnify the statistical association between ex ante forecast information and ex post security price performance, which violates semi-strong form of market efficiency.
Section 2 presents a simple model that analytically demonstrates how correlation is induced between security price performance and rational forecasts as data are truncated at both ends of the distribution. The analytics assume a symmetric distribution, i.e., no skewness. We provide the intuition that the problems due to data truncation are aggravated with skewness.
Section 3 describes the simulation procedure and presents the main results of the paper. We conclude in section 4.
Model
We begin this section with an example that provides the intuition for how data truncation can induce spurious correlation between analyst forecasts and ex post performance. We formalize the intuition in an analytic model in sections 2.2 and 2.3. Section 2.2 presents variable definitions and other preliminaries, whereas section 2.3 derives the result of spurious association.
An example
Assume an analyst makes either a low (= -$1) or a high (= +$1) earnings forecast, AF, with equal probability. Next, an earnings forecast error, FE, is realized independently and it is either low or high with equal probability. The forecast errors are therefore mean zero. Realized 7 earnings, X, which are the sum of forecasted earnings and the forecast error, will be either -$2, 0 or +$2. Since forecast errors are mean zero, expected realized earnings, E(X), for both low and high forecasts equal the forecasted level, low or high (see the table below) .
In the stylized setting described above, analysts' forecasts are rational. There is no correlation between the ex ante analyst forecast and the ex post forecast error. We next examine the consequence of data truncation. Assume a researcher deletes the two extreme earnings realizations, -$2 and +$2, from the analysis. This means 50% of the data are deleted in the stylized example here, which is an overly generous characterization of "extreme" observations.
We address this issue below. Exclusion of the two extreme earnings observations induces a perfect negative correlation between the analyst forecast and the forecast error because only those realizations that mitigate each other (i.e., AF and FE) tend to be included in the sample.
The negative correlation creates a spurious impression that analysts' high forecasts are optimistic and low forecasts are pessimistic.
The stylized example has several limitations. First, it exaggerates the extent of data truncation that is observed in practice. Second, it exaggerates the effect of data truncation by producing a perfect correlation between the forecasts and forecast errors, i.e., perfect 8 predictability. Third, it employs a symmetric distribution of discrete values, whereas actual data are better described by skewed, continuous distributions. Finally, the example analyzes forecasts and forecast errors, but not post-forecast security price performance. The security price performance is expected to be less than perfectly correlated with the forecast error, which will weaken the correlation between ex ante forecasts and ex post price performance.
Notwithstanding these limitations, the example helps convey the intuition that data truncation can produce spurious association. The analytical model below attempts to formalize the intuition and the simulation analysis seeks to demonstrate the result in a more realistic setting by relaxing all of the limitations discussed above. The degree of spurious correlation due to the truncation of a small fraction of the total sample is not large, but remains statistically highly significant, just as observed in the literature.
Model: The preliminaries
Suppose AF is analysts' consensus forecast of future earnings, X. The forecast is rational in that it is an unbiased estimate of future earnings, i.e., X = AF + FE
where FE is the forecast error, distributed normal with mean zero and variance σ 2 FE . For the moment, we assume that the forecast error, FE, is independent of AF. Later on in the simulations we allow for a mild form of dependence where the variance of the forecast errors is a function of the level of forecast AF. Earnings forecast AF is distributed normal with mean µ AF and variance σ 2 AF. However, the succeeding analysis remains qualitatively unchanged using other continuous and symmetric distributions for AF like the uniform distribution with mean µ AF .
Pricing is also assumed to be rational. An earnings forecast determines a firm's current price and realized future earnings determine its future price. Since information other than forecasted earnings and realized future earnings also influences prices, prices are expected to deviate from those based solely on forecasted and realized future earnings. The analytics below leave out this component in prices to keep the analysis as simple as possible, although the entire 9 analysis holds with the pricing function augmented to incorporate other information. The simulations in section 3 are based on the more realistic scenario. The current price is
where ERC is some earnings multiple that captures the implications of earnings for future cash flows and K captures the option value of limited liability, which is a consideration when we focus on the future price contingent on future earnings realization, X. The future price, modeled
here simply as a function of X, is
In the pricing equations K is assumed "large enough" such that P is positive for all realizations of X. From eq. (2) and (3), the change in price is the abnormal price change, AR, as a result of earnings news, FE:
We further simplify the model and the expression for AR by assuming that ERC = 1.
Consequences of data deletion
Suppose the top and bottom α percent of realized earnings, X, are considered outliers. If earnings are distributed Φ(), which in our model is a normal distribution, truncation of the upper α percent observations corresponds to an upper bound X UB on the earnings realizations that remain in the distribution after truncation. In other words,
where Φ[] is the standard normal cumulative distribution function and σ X is the standard deviation of X. Also, the truncation of the lower α percent observations corresponds to a lower bound X LB on the earnings realizations that remain in the sample. Thus,
and by symmetry, X UB -µ AF = -(X LB -µ AF ). Truncation of the top and bottom α percent realizations of X reduces the sample to
Since X is assumed to be distributed normal, it has a symmetric distribution and truncation of extreme observations leaves the mean of the truncated distribution same as that before data truncation. In cases where X has a skewed distribution, the mean of the truncated sample will differ predictably from the original untruncated sample. The simulations employ both symmetric and skewed distributions. Here, we demonstrate the effect of truncation where X has a symmetric distribution. The simulations show that skewness exacerbates the consequences of data truncation.
To test whether pricing is rational, researchers typically estimate the following crosssectional regression:
where ε i is regression error and i = 1, …, N is observation i in the untruncated sample of N observations. From (4), the residuals, ε i , will be a function of the forecast error FE i.
Thus, as long as E[FE i |AF i ] = 0 for all i, the OLS estimator will be unbiased. Since we assume rational pricing and rational analyst forecasts, E[FE i |AF i ] = 0 for the sample of N observations and thus the OLS estimator is unbiased.
We now show that restricting the sample to Ω causes FE i and AF i to cease to be independent and thus the OLS estimator of β 1 is biased. To demonstrate the bias in the estimated regression slope due to the induced dependence between the ex post forecast error and the ex ante forecast, we begin by standardizing the truncated sample bounds X LB and X UB :
and
The data truncation rule to obtain Ω is equivalent to
We next use the following property for the mean of a truncated Normal distribution (see Greene, 1997, pp. 951-952) :
where α = (a − µ)/σ,
Therefore, in the context of the truncated sample Ω,
In eq. (13) forecasts and the subsequent forecast errors because only those realizations that mitigate each other (i.e., AF and FE) tend to be included in the sample. This means that the firms more likely to be included in the sample are: (1) firms that were predicted to exhibit high growth, but failed, and (2) firms with low growth forecasts that succeeded spectacularly. Conversely, high growth forecast firms that do extremely well or low forecasted growth firms that do poorly are more likely to be truncated out of the sample. The result is apparent predictability of future performance on the basis of cross-sectional variation in forecasted growth.
The intuitive example and the model both demonstrate spurious negative association between ex ante forecasts and realized earnings as a result of data truncation assuming a symmetric distribution of earnings. The intuition, however, is applicable also for skewed distributions. The risky, high growth firms that exhibit tremendous success and thus fall in the right-tail region of a right-skewed distribution of future performance, are likely to be deleted.
This imparts a negative (spurious) correlation between ex ante forecasts and future performance.
In addition, unlike the symmetric distribution scenario, truncation of extreme observations from a right-skewed distribution will downward bias the mean of the future performance variable. This is seen from the simulation results in the next section.
Results
Summary. This section presents results of simulation analysis that examines the consequences of data truncation. We describe the simulation procedure in section 3.1. We state our assumptions about the distributions and the parameter values of the distributions used to generate simulated data. The distributions' parameter values are chosen to be comparable to the summary statistics reported in previous literature for IPOs' long-horizon stock returns and analysts' long-term forecasts of earnings growth. forecasts of long-term earnings growth using untruncated and truncated samples. Consistent with rational pricing and a lack of predictability, regressions using untruncated samples do not 13 exhibit a statistically significant coefficient on forecasted earnings growth. However, even a mild degree of truncation of ½% of the sample observations produces statistically significant negative association between forecasted growth and ex post price performance, which suggests irrational pricing and market inefficiency. The regressions explore the results' sensitivity to the degree of truncation, skewness, and sample size.
Section 3.4 presents results of the Mishkin (1983) test of rational pricing. Recently the Mishkin test has gained popularity in both accounting and finance literatures examining market efficiency (see Dechow and Sloan, 1997 , Sloan, 1996 , Collins and Hribar, 1999 , and Dechow, Hutton, and Sloan, 1999 , Thomas, 1999 . Section 3.4 briefly describes the basic idea behind the Mishkin test. We then show that the Mishkin test is well specified when we use untruncated samples. Data truncation dramatically increases the Mishkin test's rejection rate. It rises to almost 100% with 1-2% extreme observations truncated. The results suggest that the Mishkin test is powerful. However, the results also suggest that an inference of market inefficiency based on a Mishkin test is likely to be fragile because the rejection could be due to non-random data truncation.
Simulation procedure
We report each simulation result using 100 independent samples of 6,000 observations each. The choice of 6,000 observations in each sample is not unreasonable. Some studies using long-term analysts' forecasts have sample sizes much larger than 6,000 (e.g., Sloan, 1997, and Frankel and Lee, 1998) . Others like Teoh et al. (1998a, b) have 1,000 to 2,000 observations. We therefore perform sensitivity analysis using fewer and more than 6,000 observations in each sample. The distributions of the simulated samples of five-year earnings growth, forecast errors, and abnormal returns are either right-skewed or symmetric. We start by generating forecasts of annualized long-term earnings growth rates from a uniform distribution with a support of [5%, 45%] so that the average growth rate is 25% per year. Average forecasted annual earnings growth of 25% is in line with analysts' average annual long-term growth forecast for IPOs. Rajan and Servaes (1997, We calculate the five-year forecasted growth rates, FGR, by compounding the annualized growth rates. Next, we simulate right-skewed (symmetric) actual five-year growth rates by adding log-normally (normally) distributed zero-mean noise to the forecasted growth rates.
Thus, by construction, forecasted growth rates are unbiased estimates of actual growth rates.
Forecast errors are the difference between the actual and forecasted growth rates, which should have a zero mean and a skewed (symmetric) distribution. Finally, we calculate abnormal returns by adding normally distributed mean-zero noise to the forecast errors.
The annualized long-term growth rates for the simulated firms vary considerably from 5 to 45% per annum. It is reasonable to expect that there is greater uncertainty associated with the actual outcomes of the high-compared to the low-growth firms. We simulate this phenomenon by setting the standard deviation of the zero-mean noise term that is added to the forecasted earnings growth to be proportional to the forecasted growth. Specifically, assume the standard deviation of the noise term, i.e., forecast error, for a firm with the sample mean forecasted annualized growth rate of 25% is 100%. To make the standard deviation proportional to forecasted growth rate, we linearly increase the standard deviation of the noise from 80% for the 5% annualized forecasted growth rate firm to 120% for the 45% annualized forecasted growth rate firm. While a positive dependence between the forecasted earnings growth and the standard deviation of the earnings forecast errors seems economically realistic, we also report results using data simulated without such dependence.
Descriptive statistics
In The average of the minimum abnormal returns is -557%. The average of the minimum abnormal returns is -557%. Abnormal returns can be less than -100% because the normal fiveyear buy-and-hold return that is subtracted from the raw return can be greater than 100% and frequently so for high-growth firms. For example, an annual normal rate of return of 25% corresponds to over 200% buy-and-hold five-year normal rate of return.
Table 1
The distributional characteristics of the simulated samples reported in and the absence of predictability using ex ante information. In tables 1 and 2, data truncation was on the basis of ex post values of the variables, which imparts a bias in the presence of skewness.
Table 3
Table 4 provides descriptive statistics for untruncated and truncated samples of symmetric distributions. Not surprisingly, even though truncation is by realized earnings growth and regardless of whether the variance of the distributions is increasing in forecasted growth or not, mean abnormal returns is zero and mean earnings forecast errors is zero.
Table 4
Summary. Descriptive statistics in tables 1-4 show the following.
(1) The distributional properties of the simulated data are less extreme compared to those of real-life IPO return data.
(2) The distributional properties of untruncated samples are consistent with unbiased earnings forecasts and rational pricing. (3) Data truncation in the presence of skewed distributions of long-horizon returns and earnings results in biased performance that is apparently consistent with systematic mispricing. We now turn to formal tests of the consequences of data truncation on tests of rational pricing.
Linear regression tests of rational pricing
To demonstrate the effect of data truncation on tests of rational pricing, we estimate the following regression model:
where AR it+1,t+5 is five-year abnormal return for years t+1 to t+5, FGR it is five-year forecasted earnings growth for years t+1 to t+5 with the forecast made at the end of year t, β 0 and β 1 are regression coefficients, and ε it+1,t+5 is the regression error term. Regression model (16) or some variation of the model is commonly employed in the literature to test market efficiency (see, for example, Frankel and Lee, 1998 , Dechow, Hutton, and Sloan, 1999 , and Teoh et al., 1998b . A negative coefficient on FGR in eq. (16) suggests the market naively prices optimistic long-term forecasts and that subsequent returns are more negative for high, more optimistic forecasts. This violates market efficiency. Fama and MacBeth (1974) and Bernard and Thomas (1990) , we estimate a regression of future performance on scaled decile ranks assigned to the sample observations on the basis of forecasted earnings growth. The regression model is similar to model (16) except that scaled decile ranks of FGR are used.
Decile ranks of FGR are reduced by one and then scaled by 10 so that they attain values that range from 0 to 0.9. The appeal of scaled decile ranks is that the slope coefficient in model (16) is an estimate of the abnormal return to the highest-minus-lowest ranked decile portfolios, even 5 Note that there is no cross-sectional dependence in the data, so that it cannot be a source of bias in the t-statistics.
In actual long-horizon data, there is generally positive cross-sectional dependence, which tends to bias results in favor of rejecting the null hypothesis (see Brav, 1998a) . 20 though the regression itself is estimated using firm-level data. Another desirable property of ranks that is frequently discussed in the context of regressions in the capital markets literature is that the "use of ranks avoids assigning a large weight to the small number of outlying observations" (Dechow and Sloan, 1997, p. 23) . Table 6 reports results of estimating model (16) 
Table 6
We next present the second piece of evidence that suggests the abnormal performance induced by data truncation is economically significant. We form quintile portfolios on the basis of ranking stocks on forecasted earnings growth. Table 7 reports average abnormal returns on the quintile portfolios with no data truncation and one and two percent data truncation. Because we simulate data consistent with rational pricing, in the absence of data truncation all the quintile portfolios earn abnormal returns that are statistically and economically indistinguishable from zero. The highest growth forecast quintile earns a five-year abnormal return of 0.01%, and the lowest quintile portfolio's abnormal return is a mere -0.04%. Truncation of extreme earnings growth observations rapidly creates the appearance of systematic mispricing. With 2% of the observations truncated, the highest forecasted earnings growth quintile has an economically and statistically significant abnormal return of -46.2% (t-statistic = -59.2) and the lowest forecasted earnings growth quintile's abnormal return is a modest 4.3% (t-statistic = 14.4).
Table 7
In summary, evidence in tables 6 and 7 suggests that, when working with long-horizon financial data that is right skewed, even a small amount of data truncation can generate economically large magnitudes of apparent abnormal returns consistent with market inefficiency.
The magnitudes of estimated β 1 coefficients (i.e., returns to zero-investment portfolios) and the average explanatory power of the regression model (16) independent variables and 12 year dummies. The independent variable of interest in testing the predictability of post-IPO returns is discretionary current accruals. Teoh et al. (1998 Teoh et al. ( , p. 1955 report "a significantly negative coefficient of -0.227 (p-value 0.03)" on discretionary current accruals and conclude "firms with high earnings management proxy to boost earnings in the year 22 of the IPO subsequently show greater underperformance." The regression model has a 6.37 percent explanatory power, but, as noted above, the model includes 22 other variables including three-year market return.
Mishkin (1983) tests of rational pricing
Description of the test. Mishkin (1983) 
where AR t is abnormal return in period t, Earn t is realized earnings in period t, E[Earn t | θ t-1 ] are expected earnings conditional on the information set at time t-1, θ t-1 , β 0 and β 1 are regression parameters, and ν t is the regression error. Market rationality of earnings expectations requires abnormal returns to be independent of the information set θ t-1 . The Mishkin test examines whether a particular expression of the expectation E[Earn t |θ t-1 ] is rational in this "informationefficiency" sense. In our context, we apply the Mishkin text to examine whether the market rationally uses information in growth forecasts in setting current prices so that future performance is related to unexpected earnings growth, but not forecasted growth. Specifically,
If analysts' expectations of growth, FGR, are rational, then forecast errors, FE, would be uncorrelated with FGR. In addition, we can test if the market's pricing is rational, by estimating the following system of equations:
Rational expectations require that α 0 = α * 0 and α 1 = α * 1 , which is a non-linear constraint in the system of above two equations. The Mishkin test estimates the above system with and without the constraint of rationality. Whether the constraint is binding or not is ascertained on the basis of the log-likelihood ratio of the constrained and unconstrained sum of squared errors, which has a chi-square distribution.
In the case of linear pricing models with normally distributed earnings variables, the expectation models are also linear. Our model and subsequent simulations allow us to examine the effect of skewness on the specification of the Mishkin test when we impose the null of rationality with no data truncation. We believe this is uncharted territory. When we apply the Mishkin test on truncated samples, the null hypothesis is false, and thus the application of the Mishkin test on truncated samples enables us to comment on the power of the Mishkin test.
Results. Table 8 and 0.05 levels of significance. At these significance levels, the expected rejection rates are 1 and 5%. Assuming independent samples and a Binomial distribution of the rejection frequencies under the null hypothesis, the actual rejection rates significantly exceed the expected rejection rates at the 0.05 level of significance. However, the rejection frequency is not too large in absolute terms and thus the test is not too badly misspecified. The modest degree of 24 misspecification appears to be a consequence of skewed distributions. Unreported simulations using symmetric distributions confirm our conjecture.
Table 8
The striking result in table 8 is the consequence of truncation on the Mishkin test's rejection frequency. The rejection rate rises quickly with truncation and it reaches almost 100% when 1% of the extreme observations (i.e., ½% extreme negative and ½% extreme positive observations) are deleted. The Mishkin test thus appears to be extremely powerful in detecting even small (apparent or real) departures from rationality. The question, however, is whether data truncation has in part contributed to the departures from rationality in an empirical experiment.
Sensitivity tests
We examine the sensitivity of the Mishkin test to two parameters of interest: sample size and the variance of abnormal returns. Increasing the sample size in statistical hypothesis testing yields more powerful tests. In our model, a larger sample size decreases the estimation variance of the regression parameters, α 0 , α 1 , β 0 and β 1 , making the Mishkin test more powerful in detecting mispricing. However, simulations in the preceding section suggest that increased power will come at a price: any spurious correlation induced by extreme data truncation will also be detected with above normal frequency.
In addition to sensitivity to sample size, we examine how the variance of abnormal returns affects the specification and power of the Mishkin test. Although we believe that our parameter value for the variance of abnormal returns is on the conservative side in the context of IPOs, the Mishkin test is used in a wide variety of test scenarios. We expect that a larger variance of abnormal returns will lead to relatively more extreme observations being truncated from the sample, thus aggravating the bias induced by truncation.
We examine the effects of sample size by replicating the simulation procedure using sample sizes from 2,000 through 10,000 (in increments of 2,000). To benchmark the results with those of the previous section, we hold the truncation at 1% of the extreme earnings growth 25 observations in the sample and the variance of abnormal returns is maintained at 235%. Table 9, panel A reports the results. As expected, increases in sample size make the Mishkin test more powerful. Compared to 90% rejection rate at the 0.01 level for samples of 6,000 observations, the rejection rate is 57% for samples of 2,000 observations and 100% for samples of 10,000
observations. To examine the effect of sample size on the regression test of rationality, we report the average t-statistic on the estimated slope coefficient and the average explanatory power of the regression of abnormal returns on earnings forecasts. The average t-statistic is -2.60 for a sample size of 2,000 and decreases to -5.70 for a sample size of 10,000. The adjusted R 2 of the regressions slightly decreases as sample size increases, from 0.40% for a sample size of 2,000 to 0.33% for a sample size of 10,000. Overall, the results indicate significant rejection of the null hypothesis of rationality for all sample sizes examined.
Table 9
Panel B of table 9 reports the effect of variance on the rejection rates of the Mishkin test.
Intuitively, increasing the variance of abnormal returns will make the truncated observations on the right side of the distribution more extreme, increasing the bias induced by truncation. Again to benchmark the results, we use samples of 6,000 observations and the truncation rate is maintained at 1% of the extreme earnings growth observations in the sample. We increase the variance of abnormal returns from 80% to 500%. Consistent with the intuition, the results suggest that increasing the variance of realized earnings growth increases the rejection rate of the
Mishkin test.
Probabilistic truncation of extreme observations. So far we examine the effect of truncating each of the α% extreme observations. Perhaps a more realistic setting is one in which extreme observations are more likely to be deleted, but not certain to be deleted. To simulate this case, we construct truncated samples in which each of the α% extreme observations has a 50% probability of being truncated out of the sample. The tenor of unreported results from these simulations is similar to those reported earlier. Once again, the conclusion is that tests of rationality are extremely sensitive to non-random data deletion and truncation of extreme observations.
Summary.
The results in this section show that, with only a modest amount of data truncation, the regression test and the Mishkin test both would indicate a significant rejection of the null hypothesis of rationality for a wide range of sample sizes and variance of realized future earnings growth. The results are not sensitive to the choice of parameter values.
Conclusions and Implications for Future Research
We argue that the previously documented association between ex ante information variables (e.g., analyst forecasts or management's optimistic financial reporting) and the subsequent, apparently predictable security price performance is potentially exaggerated. The exaggeration stems from a combination of (i) the right-skewness of long-horizon security returns and financial performance measures, and (ii) data truncation of extreme observations. These are common and almost inevitable research design features of previous studies and in many cases beyond the control of a researcher. In particular, we show that if the sample firms' survival and/or data deletion are not random with respect to the ex post performance variables, statistical inferences are biased. We demonstrate this in our paper using a simple model where the market rationally prices unbiased earnings forecasts. The results suggest a more careful economic analysis in linking ex ante information to ex post performance, rather than using the statistical properties of the data to guide sample selection and data truncation.
Simulations demonstrate that both forecast optimism and negative abnormal returns are induced when "extreme" observations of ex post long-horizon performance are truncated from the sample. As a consequence of data truncation, a statistically and economically significant association between ex ante earnings growth forecast and ex post abnormal performance is induced. We also show that the Mishkin test, which has become popular in the market efficiency literature, will almost certainly reject the null hypothesis of rational pricing in the presence of just one or two percent of extreme observations being truncated. The Mishkin test is thus well 27 specified and extremely powerful, provided that the sample does not suffer from non-random survival biases and/or data truncation. Overall, our results suggest caution should be exercised in interpreting the results of the accounting and finance research that examines the predictability of long-horizon performance based on ex-ante information.
Teoh, S., I. Welch, and T. Wong, 1998a, Earnings management and the long-run underperformance of seasoned equity offerings, Journal of Financial Economics 50, 63-100.
Teoh, S., I. Welch, and T. Wong, 1998b, Earnings management and the long-run underperformance of initial public offerings, Journal of Finance 53, 1935 Finance 53, -1974 Thomas, W., 1999, A test of the market's (mis)pricing of domestic and foreign earnings, working paper, University of Utah. Table 1 Descriptive statistics: Data truncation by extreme values of realized earnings growth
Descriptive statistics for untruncated and truncated samples of abnormal returns, five-year forecasted and realized earnings growth, and forecast errors. Simulations use skewed distributions with variance of realized growth increasing in forecasted growth and the standard deviation of five-year abnormal returns is equal to 235%. Descriptive statistics are simple averages of the summary statistics for 100 independent samples of 6,000 observations each with zero data truncation and progressive subsamples with up to 2% of the extreme realized fiveyear earnings growth observations truncated. where AR it+1,t+5 is five-year abnormal return for years t+1 to t+5, FGR it is five-year forecasted earnings growth for years t+1 to t+5 with the forecast made at the end of year t, β 0 and β 1 are regression coefficients, and ε it+1,t+5 is the regression error term. The regressions are estimated using untruncated and truncated samples of abnormal returns and five-year forecasted earnings growth. Samples are truncated either by deleting observations with extreme values of actual earnings growth (panel A) or earnings forecast errors (panel B). Data for the regressions are simulated using parameters for right-skewed distributions with variance of realized earnings growth increasing in forecasted growth and the standard deviation of five-year abnormal returns equal to 235% (see table 1 ). Regression results are based on 100 independent samples of 6,000 observations each. where AR it+1,t+5 is five-year abnormal return for years t+1 to t+5, RFGR it is the scaled decile rank of five-year forecasted earnings growth for years t+1 to t+5 with the forecast made at the end of year t, β 0 and β 1 are regression coefficients, and ε it+1,t+5 is the regression error term. All sample observations are ranked according to forecasted five-year earnings growth and assigned decile ranks. Scaled decile ranks are decile ranks minus one divided by 10. The regressions are estimated using untruncated and truncated samples of abnormal returns and five-year forecasted earnings growth. Samples are truncated either by deleting observations with extreme values of actual earnings growth (panel A) or earnings forecast errors (panel B). Data for the regressions are simulated using parameters for right-skewed distributions with variance of realized earnings growth increasing in forecasted growth and the standard deviation of five-year abnormal returns equal to 235%. Regression results are based on 100 independent samples of 6,000 observations each. Table 7 Five-year average abnormal returns on quintile portfolios formed on the basis of ranking stocks on forecasted earnings growth: Data truncation by extreme values of realized earnings growth
Truncation

Quintile portfolios are formed by ranking all observations according to forecasted five-year earnings growth. Abnormal returns are measured over five years following the earnings growth forecast. Samples are truncated by deleting observations with extreme values of actual earnings growth. Data are simulated using parameters for rightskewed distributions with variance of realized earnings growth increasing in forecasted growth and the standard deviation of five-year abnormal returns equal to 235%. Abnormal returns and t-statistics for the quintile portfolios reported below are simple averages of the abnormal returns and t-statistics for the 100 independent samples of 6,000 observations each. T-statistic for each sample of 6,000 observations is calculated as the ratio of the sample mean average abnormal return to the cross-sectional standard deviation divided by (N -1) 1/2 , where N = the sample size = 6,000 if no data are truncated. where FE t+5 is the earnings forecast error over a five-year horizon, AR it+1,t+5 is five-year abnormal return for years t+1 to t+5, FGR it is five-year forecasted earnings growth for years t+1 to t+5 with the forecast made at the end of year t, α 0 , α 1 , β 0 and β 1 are regression coefficients, and ε t+5 and ν t+5 are regression errors. The Mishkin test imposes the constraints that α 0 = -α * 0 and α 1 = -α * 1 . The Mishkin test statistic of rationality is the log-likelihood ratio 2N*Ln(SSR c /SSR u ) ~ χ 2 (q), where N = the number of observations, q = 1, the number of constraints, and SSR is the sum of squared residuals from the constrained or unconstrained regression system. We report the number of times out of 100 estimations the Mishkin test indicates rejection of rationality at 0.01 and 0.05 level of significance. The analysis is performed using untruncated samples and samples truncated by deleting up to 2% of the observations with extreme values of actual earnings growth. Using these samples, we also estimate the following regression model: AR it+1,t+5 = β 0 + β 1 FGR it + ε it+1,t+5
Five
where β 0 and β 1 are regression coefficients, and ε it+1,t+5 is the regression error term. We report average values of tstatistics of the estimated slope coefficient, and adjusted r-squares. Data for the tests are simulated using parameters for right-skewed distributions with variance of realized earnings growth increasing in forecasted growth and the standard deviation of five-year abnormal returns equal to 235% (see table 1 ). Results are based on 100 independent samples of 6,000 observations each. where FE t+5 is the earnings forecast error over a five-year horizon, AR it+1,t+5 is five-year abnormal return for years t+1 to t+5, FGR it is five-year forecasted earnings growth for years t+1 to t+5 with the forecast made at the end of year t, α 0 , α 1 , β 0 and β 1 are regression coefficients, and ε t+5 and ν t+5 are regression errors. The Mishkin test imposes the constraints that α 0 = -α * 0 and α 1 = -α * 1 . The Mishkin test statistic of rationality is the log-likelihood ratio 2N*Ln(SSR c /SSR u ) ~ χ 2 (q), where N = the number of observations, q = 1, the number of constraints, and SSR is the sum of squared residuals from the constrained or unconstrained regression system. We report the number of times out of 100 estimations the Mishkin test indicates rejection of rationality at 0.01 and 0.05 level of significance. The analysis is performed using untruncated samples and samples truncated by deleting 1% of the observations with extreme values of actual earnings growth. Using these samples, we also estimate the following regression model: AR it+1,t+5 = β 0 + β 1 FGR it + ε it+1,t+5 where β 0 and β 1 are regression coefficients, and ε it+1,t+5 is the regression error term. We report average values of tstatistics of the estimated slope coefficient, and adjusted r-squares. Data for the tests are simulated using parameters for right-skewed distributions with variance of realized earnings growth increasing in forecasted growth. In panel A, the standard deviation of five-year abnormal returns is set equal to 235% (see table 1) and the sample size varies from 2,000 to 10,000. In panel B, the sample size is 6,000 observations and the standard deviation of five-year abnormal returns is from 80% to 500%. All the results are based on 100 independent samples each. 
Data truncation in % of observations
